Learned counsel for the State has further contended that once Section 32-A of the NDPS Act has been held to be constitutionally valid, the effort to compare the conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC with that under Section 32-A of the NDPS Act is an exercise in futility Learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer of the petitioners on the ground that Section 32-A of the NDPS Act curtails the statutory power of the concerned Government and accordingly the same has been stipulated in the Manual and hence, no fault can be found with action taken by the State Government.
What, we ask, was the purpose of writing this passage and what was the object of the distribution of the leaflet in the Court premises at a time when the Court was in the midst of hearing the appeals ? The attitude of the Government is thus depicted surely with a purpose and that purpose cannot but be to raise in the minds of the reader a feeling that the Government, by holding out high hopes of future employment, encourages the Judges to give decisions in its favour.
The passage read as a 684 whole clearly amounts to this: "Government disfavours Judges who give decisions against it but favours those Judges with high appointments who decide Lawyer in Chandigarh
its favour: that although this is calculated to tempt Judges to give judgments Advocate in Chandigarh
favour of the Government it has so far not made any difference in the firmness and justice of the Judges. " The linking up of these words with the preceding words by the conjunction "but" brings into relief the real significance and true meaning of the earlier words.
136 of the Constitution. " The words that follow are to the effect that sources that are in the know say that the Government acts with partiality in the matter of appointment of those Judges as Ambassadors, Governors, High Commissioners, etc. The object of writing this paragraph and particularly of publishing it at the time it was actually done was quite clearly to affect the minds of the Judges and to deflect them from the strict performance of their duties. This insinuation is made manifest by the words that follow, namely, "this has so far not made any difference Lawyers in Chandigarh
the firmness and justice of the Hon'ble Judges.
A section of the Bar seems to be labouring under an erroneous impression that when an Advocate Chandigarh
is acting in the interests of his client or in accordance with his instructions he is discharging his legitimate duty towards him even when he signs an application or a pleading which contains matter scandalizing the Court and that when there is conflict between his obligations to the Court and his duty to the client, the later prevails. The plain meaning of these words is that the Judges who decide against the Government do not get these high appointments.
The necessary implication of these words is that the Judges who decide in favour of the Government are rewarded by the Government with these appointments. Surely, there was hidden in the offending passage a warning that although the Judges have "so far" remained firm and resisted the temptation of deciding cases in favour of Government in expectation of getting high appointments, nevertheless, if they decide in favour of the Government on this occasion knowledgeable people will know that they had succumbed to the temptation and had given judgment in favour of the Government in expectation of future reward in the shape of high appointments of the kind mentioned in the passage.
It no doubt begins with a declaration of public faith in this Court but this is immediately followed by other words connected with the earlier words by the significant conjunction "but. Learned counsel for the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, maintained that the passage in question was perfectly innocuous and only expressed a laudatory sentiment towards the Court and that such flattery could not possibly have the slightest effect on the minds of the Judges of this august tribunal.
We do not think flattery was the sole or even the main object with which this passage was written or with which it was published at the time when the hearing of the appeals was in progress. Sufficient safeguard and guarantee for the exercise of this power lie in the trust reposed by the Constitution in the wisdom and good sense of judges of the Supreme Court. 136 of the Constitution. , who give judgments against the Government.
This power is not hedged in by technical hurdles of any kind when it is called in aid against any arbitrary adjudication or for advancing the cause of justice or for giving a fair deal to a litigant so that in justice may not be perpetrated or perpetuated. Beyond this no set formula, or rule can stand in the way of or fetter the exercise of the power conferred on the Supreme Court under Art. " The words "so far" are significant.
Appeals under articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 16th February, 1953, of the Court of Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer, in Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. Conclusiveness or finality given to any decision by any domestic law cannot dater the Supreme Court from exercising the power conferred under Art.